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Introduction
British official documents in the immediate post-WWI period repeatedly invoke
divisions in Egyptian society as a strategy to justify their occupation of the country since
1882 and to ensure ongoing access to its resources in an era of increasing international
attention to self-determination. The proclamation of a British protectorate at the onset of
World War I in 1914 led to a period of unrest in Egypt, culminating in the 1919 revolution.
The British government responded to the revolution by sending a Special Mission to Egypt
in 1921 to investigate the cause of the uprising. The Report of the Special Mission and
related British official documents dating from the aftermath of the 1919 revolution present
Egyptian society as essentially divided, recalcitrant, and backward. It was important for the
British to position themselves as the superior power to protect both their international
reputation and their strategic interests in Egypt. Thus, they presented divisions amongst
the fellahin (peasants), women, and students in Egypt as “natural” and any common cause
between them in the service of national liberation as an ephemeral product of “agitators”
and “extremists.” It was beneficial for the British to divide these three sectors of society to
appear as though Egypt was not – could not be - united against them. This was part of a
complex colonial plan to make Egypt appear orderly and under control within the
framework of post-WWI British Empire.
The central project of this thesis is to address the manner in which and extent to
which social divisions appear in sources preserved in the British National Archives. While
divide and rule tactics are well-known to historians of British empire, the frequency with
which the fellahin, women, and students are invoked in these documents suggests that they
were the most important and useful social categories to the British occupation of Egypt. In
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other words, these three categories emerge from the sources themselves and distinguish
the Egyptian case. Thus, I ask how and why the British emphasized the fellahin, women,
and students in official documents following the 1919 revolution. Scholarship has largely
recognized the challenges the British faced in protecting their interests in Egypt after
World War I, yet the way in which the British insisted upon the incompatibility between
the fellahin, women, and students in the 1919 revolution has been underestimated as a
strategy for ensuring their continued presence in the country. The pattern, weight, and
repetition of these categories in the sources indicates that the production of these divisions
was part of a discourse of justification and a plan for ongoing British control that
transcends any individual. The images that appear in British official documents and the
Report of the Special Mission to Egypt were repeated to such an extent that they took on a
life of their own.
The first chapter assesses the British perception of the fellahin population, who
were portrayed as isolated from Egyptian nationalist unrest in the cities and blissfully
content with the British occupation until the 1919 revolution. The mobilization of the
fellahin in the revolution received considerable attention because the British had
characterized the fellahin as supporters of the occupation. 1 In Workers and Peasants in the
Modern Middle East, Joel Benin states that “during the war peasants evaded the demands of
the British rulers to the extent they could – a common ‘weapon of the weak.’” 2 Since this
kind of resistance was often invisible, it was easy for British officials to interpret them as –

Edmund Allenby, Allenby in Palestine: The Middle East Correspondence of Field Marshal Viscount
Allenby, June 1917-October 1919, ed. Matthew Hughes (Stoud: Published by Sutton for the Army
Records Society, 2004).
2 Joel Beinin, The Contemporary Middle East: Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 87.
1
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or to make them appear – content with conditions in the country. Any visible discontent
was quickly written off by the British as a result of abuse of power by the Egyptian officials
(known by the title of “Omdeh”) the British employed to administer the provinces. In other
words, for the British it was not wartime policies, but the manner in which they were
carried out by corrupt Egyptian bureaucrats that led the fellahin to lose confidence in the
British and join the 1919 revolution. This claim was convenient and beneficial to
preserving their position in Egypt. The British used the Omdeh as a scapegoat and depicted
this to be the target of fellahin resistance, not the occupation itself.
Historiography of the British occupation points to a much longer history of
opposition among the fellahin than British official documents from the period portray.
Scholars’ emphasis on the fellahin’s participation in the revolution indicates that Egypt was
in fact much more unified than the British were prepared to recognize. It becomes evident
that it was part of their divide and conquer strategy to present the fellahin to be exploited
and brainwashed by other sectors of Egyptian society and the revolution as their very first
act of defiance. In the Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914, Robert
Tignor states that “the British used [fellahin] isolation and their separation from the
Egyptian population to enhance their image of moral and physical superiority over the
Egyptians.”3 In The History of Egypt, P.J. Vatikiotis explains, “it was perhaps natural for the
rural population to explode in the manner they did.”4 While the British professed surprise
at the peasants’ role in the revolution and portrayed the apparent unity of the Egyptian
population as unnatural and ephemeral, other observers saw it as a major blow to

Robert Tignor, Modernization and British colonial rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1966), 395.
4 P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt. 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
3
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imperialism in the post-WWI era. In “Peasants in Revolt-Egypt 1919,” Ellis Goldberg argues
that “contemporaries viewed [the revolution] as having international importance because
it was the result of thirty years of European domination, and its resolution would be likely
to affect all Western colonial empires.” 5 British officials who wanted to stabilize and
preserve their imperial privileges in this atmosphere had to work very hard to justify
themselves to the rest of the world.
The second chapter dissects the complexity of the position of Egyptian women
amidst evolving imperialist and nationalist propaganda. Concurrent with the nationalist
movement in Egypt, an international feminist movement was in full swing and greatly
concerned with the status of “Eastern” women. Along with the fellahin, Egyptian women’s
participation in the revolution revealed their discontent towards the British occupation.
Their participation also made it explicitly obvious that Egypt was much more unified than
the British professed. British official documents from this period were extremely defensive
about the position of Egyptian women and painted them to be ignorant, unintelligent, and
helpless to justify colonial rule. British officials constantly discussed reforms targeting
women. In these documents, it was beneficial to highlight “new opportunities” for Egyptian
women’s education since 1882, which implied that they had not existed before the British
intervened. Yet according to Vatikiotis, “at the turn of the century 95 percent of Egyptians
were illiterate, and until 1920 hardly more than 1 percent of the annual budget of Egyptian
governments was ever devoted to education. Education during the British occupation had
been neglected.”6 The British intentionally neglected education because they feared it

Ellis Goldberg, "Peasants in Revolt — Egypt 1919," International Journal of Middle East Studies 24,
no. 2 (1992): 261, http://www.jstor.org/stable/164298.
6 Vatikiotis, 435.
5
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would spread nationalism. In regard to women, they “reformed” their curriculum to teach
domestic tasks, such as sewing and daily hygiene. Domestic reforms actually narrowed
opportunities for women, while the British boasted that they were modernizing the
country.
Historians emphasize the importance of the Egyptian women’s participation in the
1919 revolution because, yet again, it reveals a much longer history of Egyptian feminist
activity. Beinin states in “Egypt: Society and Economy, 1923-1952” that “the participation
of women in the street demonstrations during the 1919 nationalist uprising irrevocably
endowed the women’s awakening with nationalist legitimacy.” 7 In The Women’s Awakening
in Egypt, Beth Baron argues:
For the first time in Egyptian history, according to many accounts, women were
thrust from the private realm onto the public stage. The revolution is thus often
taken as the first expression of nationalist sentiment on the part of women, as well
as the crucible of the women’s movement. Yet women’s participation in the events
of 1919 were a continuation and extension of the activities of the previous decades.8
Just as the British professed surprise that the fellahin revolted, the British had not expected
the women to participate in the revolution because they intentionally implemented
reforms to keep women isolated and uneducated. Conversely, British documents suggest
that the British took credit for feminist activity and female education reforms. Yet
historiography reveals that Egyptians were the ones to push for female education
advancements during the occupation. For example, Leila Ahmed discloses that “in 1912 the
nationalists opened community centers which offered lectures and cultural events which

Joel Beinin, “Egypt: Society and Economy, 1923-1952,” in The Cambridge History of Egypt, ed. by
M.W. Daly (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 314.
8 Beth Baron, The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society, and the Press, (London, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1994), 35.
7
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women as well as men were encouraged to attend- and which women did attend.”9 It was
beneficial for the British to ignore this type of activity in British official documents in order
to take credit for any instance of feminist activity. British officials stressed the
contributions of their presence by playing into this rhetoric, reiterating the constraints of
the Islamic religion on women, and crediting themselves for Egyptian feminism. Similar to
how the British blamed fellahin discontent after the 1919 revolution on the Omdeh the
British argue that Egyptian women’s discontent after the 1919 revolution had to do with
the inadequacies of Egyptian society. The British used the apparent low-status of Egyptian
women to justify the need for colonial rule. Yet again, Britain strategically assigned blame
onto Egyptians to defend the need for an ongoing colonial presence.
The third chapter highlights the role Egyptian students played as the “lead
agitators”10 in the 1919 revolution. While British official documents emphasize the
unexpectedness of the fellahin’s and women’s participation in the revolution, they
predicted unrest amongst Egyptian students. British official documents identify students as
the leaders of the disturbances leading up to the revolution and divide them into two
categories: students attending Al-Azhar, the premier religious institution of higher
education in Egypt, and students in government run schools. Students and teachers of AlAzhar are depicted as the primary “agitators” and were blamed for feeding nationalist

Leila Ahmed, “Feminism and Feminist movements in the Middle East, a Preliminary Exploration:
Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen,” Women’s Studies International
Forum, Vol.5 (1982), 155-156.
10 NA/FO 141/521/4, Letter, Ayerst Henham Hooker to Lord Allenby, Foreign Office Papers on Mr.
Ayerst Henham Hooker’s views and reports on the Egyptian Situation 1919-1923.
9
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propaganda to students in government schools through religious education. Similar to how
the British attributed the fellahin’s unrest to the lack of British presence in the provinces,
British official documents claim that student disturbances were a result of the lack of
British teachers in government run schools. In their view, Egyptian students were led
astray by the fanatical inclinations of their instructors and by the backwardness of their
own parents. Once again, it was not the occupation itself, but the inadequacies of the
Egyptian population that were painted as the root causes of the revolution. This was a
strategy for asserting the blamelessness of and ongoing need for British presence in the
country.
The historiography reveals the complexity of unrest amongst students. They were
not brainwashed by religious teachers, nor was their activism the result of an unsupervised
upbringing. It was instead a product of domestic and international factors, which the
British authorities deliberately downplayed. In The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian
Nationalism, Jamal Mohammad Ahmed states that “the educated classes in Cairo and the
provincial cities looked upon President Wilson’s declaration as the fulfilment of their
dream.”11 President Wilson’s “14 Points” speech advocated for self-determination and gave
Egyptians the hope that freedom from colonial rule was a feasible goal. In Egypt from
Independence to Revolution 1919-1952, Selma Botman argues:
what originated as a peaceful political proposal initiated by largely upper-class
Egyptian notables, who were influenced by the speeches of President Woodrow
Wilson of the United States defending national self-determination, turned into
revolutionary activity carried out by the mass population. 12

Jamal Muhammad Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism. Middle Eastern
Monographs (London, New York: Oxford University press, 1960), 117.
12 Selma Botman, Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919-1952, Contemporary Issues in the
Middle East (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 29.
11
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In the post-World War I context, President Wilson’s speech made it even more difficult for
the British to make a case for ongoing colonialism. The British were aware of the influence
of President Wilson’s speech on Egyptians, so British officials deliberately deflected
attention away from the righteousness and capability of Egyptian nationalists to paint
Egyptians as incapable of self-rule
Analysis of British foreign office documents affirms the complexity of Britain’s
position as an imperial power in Egypt at a time of increased international attention to
questions of liberation and self-determination. The British strategically and consciously
isolated the fellahin, students, and women from one another as part of their divide and rule
tactic. Divisions were constantly produced, even within those three sectors of society, as a
way to explain the nation’s unrest. Every statement, letter, or document produced in British
official documents reveals how thoroughly invested in this social construct the British
were. Yet, the 1919 revolution forced British officials to contend with an overwhelming
display of Egyptian unity. Thus, British official documents and the Report of the Special
Mission to Egypt published after the 1919 revolution reveal how their divide and rule tactic
failed in Egypt. Nonetheless, they maintained that such unity was superficial, and the real
enemies of the Egyptian people were their own corruption, religious fanaticism, and
ignorance. The only answer was continuing, if not increasing, British presence. In reality,
the Egyptians were neither inherently disobedient, nor inferior to the British, despite these
portrayals. It was simply beneficial to the British to perpetuate these stereotypes. British
portrayals of Egyptian society sought to position the British Empire in new colonial,
domestic, and international contexts in a way that would ensure its survival. In the
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Egyptian context, it was part of Britain’s plan to maintain their position as Egypt’s
protectorate.
The conclusions reached in each chapter rely on British official documents produced
during or after the 1919 revolution and the Report of the Special Mission to Egypt. I
traveled to the British National Archives in August 2017 and January 2018 to conduct my
research. Upon my first trip, the sources I found were letters from British expatriates in
Egypt written to Lord Allenby, the High Commissioner of Egypt. These series of letter
addressed the cause of the unrest that led up to the 1919 revolution. Research during the
second visit focused on specific reports produced by the foreign office about the fellahin,
women, and students. These reports were commissioned by subcommittees of the Special
Mission and published between 1920 and 1921. The purpose of the reports was to
investigate the unrest and opposition to the protectorate, with the goal of bringing clarity
to the overall situation. It becomes very clear that these reports were not actually
concerned with Egyptian grievances but were a way of deflecting responsibility. Lastly, the
Report of the Special Mission to Egypt was integral to my argument because it analyzed the
situation in Egypt prior to WWI, during WWI, and after WWI, and offered a proposal from
the Mission on how to best proceed in Egypt. The report was important because it
recognized that Britain’s divide and rule tactic had failed, but maintained the assumptions
that had driven and justified that tactic prior to 1919.
In order to analyze what was being said about a specific social group, I examined
how tropes relating to fellahin, students, and women were present across a series of
documents. Focusing on each social group allowed me to recognize the patterns and
repetition that were produced by the British. The extent to which these images reoccur
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indicates that these divisions were produced by the British and that these three social
categories were depicted to be the most important to the British. Furthermore, I looked at
the sources in chronological order because of the distinct shift in Britain’s perception of
social categories after the 1919 revolution. British officials were under scrutiny from
Parliament, so they became defensive of their position and sought to deflect the blame.
While my primary research was limited to the British perspective of the situation, I also
surveyed secondary literature on the colonial period in Egypt, which draws from both
British and Egyptian sources. My contribution to this literature lies in a close reading of a
substantial cluster of primary sources from a short but high-profile period in the history of
British Empire, Egyptian nationalism, and anti-colonial internationalism.

13

Chapter 1: Fellahin
Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 as a leading colonial power with financial and
strategic plans in mind.13 Egypt was an extremely important colonial venture for the British
because the events that precipitated their occupation would influence what would happen
in other parts of their empire. 14 During their occupation, significant cultural and political
change occurred in Egypt, which provided insight into changing British strategies of
colonial domination and rule. Analysis of British reports on fellahin (Egyptian peasants)
grievances during World War I indicate that the British sought to isolate the fellahin from
Egyptian society because of the complexity of the post-war period. The British empire not
only had to protect their colonial position in Egypt, but also had to carefully portray their
image in a complex international, colonial, and domestic context. Given the unrest amongst
Egyptian students in the cities, it was imperative to keep the fellahin isolated in the
provinces. Reforms were implemented that would keep the fellahin illiterate and confined
to agricultural careers. 15 The British hoped this would keep the fellahin on their side.
British official documents from 1919 suggest that the British perceived World War I as a
turning point for the fellahin – the point at which they turned against the
British. This misperception was caused by a combination of ignorance and calculated
strategy, as British officials consistently underestimated the fellahin and pursued divide
and rule tactics intended to isolate rural areas from the cities. Although wartime grievances

Ronal Robinson, Ronal Edward, and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (St. Martins Press,
1962), 261.
14 Tignor, Modernization, 12.
15 NA/FO 848/6, Evidence of Mr. R.A. Brown (Controller, Administrative Service, Ministry of
Education), 7/1/1920, Foreign Office Papers of evidence taken by Mission in Egypt 1919-1920, Mr.
R.A. Brown states, “by the old system of education, a class was being created entirely unfitted for
agriculture, the mainspring of Egypt’s prosperity.”
13
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were the precipitating cause for the 1919 revolution, they represented the culmination of a
much longer history of resistance to the British occupation across all sectors of Egyptian
society.
In the late nineteenth century, Egypt’s importance to Britain increased following the
completion of the Suez Canal in November 1869; the canal’s location shortened the trip
from Britain to India drastically. 16 Maintaining control of the Suez Canal was geopolitically
and economically strategic, thereby serving the empire’s own interests. Upon arrival in
Egypt, British officials quickly realized that reforming the Egyptian political and economic
structure would not be an easy task. Egypt was nearly bankrupt and in debt around
£100,000,000 because of Khedive17 Ismail’s (1863-1879) excessive spending.18
Nonetheless, in the first ten years of the occupation, British officials successfully stabilized
Egypt’s finances, reorganized the administrative system, and reformed the judicial system.
British administrators in Egypt received considerable attention for their success in this
period, much of which has been attributed to Counsel General of Egypt, Lord Cromer. 19
The British were well versed colonists by the time they occupied Egypt in 1882.
With each colonial endeavor the British experimented with ruling techniques to see what
would be the most effective in a given colony. Thus, when faced with adversity in Egypt, it
made sense that the British drew on previous techniques that had been successful in other

Tignor, Modernization, 12.
The Term Khedive refers to the Viceroy of Egypt under Turkish Rule.
18 Robert Tignor, “The Indianization of the Egyptian Administration under British Rule,” The
American Historical Review, vol. 68, No. 3. (April 1963): 636-637.
19 Daly states, “As an estate manager there is little argument about Cromer’s success. During his
tenure the proportion of Egypt’s budget devoted to servicing the debt was reduced by half; annual
government revenue almost doubled, while taxes were progressively reduced; the value of imports
rose fourfold. Huge sums were expended on irrigation and agriculture, and agricultural
productivity (admittedly difficult to measure) increased.” 242.
16
17
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colonies. In the case of Egypt, historians have drawn a parallel between ruling techniques
and implemented reforms in Egypt and India. Tignor explains that “within certain limits,
therefore, Egyptian modernization during the British occupation was guided by Indian
models. It was carried out by English officials, drawn almost exclusively from India.” 20
British officials introduced institutions, policies, and programs largely based on what had
been successful in India. Due to the success in the first ten years of the occupation, it may
be suggested that the British thought Egypt could be a replica of their apparent success in
India. Therefore, British officials relied heavily on their experience in India in Egypt. While
this may have worked to restore Egypt’s financials and stabilize the government, the
Egyptian unrest during the protectorate and post-World War I period revealed that
effective ruling techniques differed from colony to colony. 21
From the start of the occupation, British officials professed that the occupation of
Egypt would be temporary. The Special Mission to Egypt Report states that their goal was
to “secure the stability and tranquility of Egypt so that it would not be torn by internal
disturbances and thus threaten England’s strategic route to the East.” 22 The Mission
concludes that the uncertainty of the occupation created the belief amongst Egyptians that
the British would depart once their finances were straightened out. Historians conclude
that British authoritie’s lack of transparency about their goals contributed to Egyptian
resentment. 23 For example, the Mission describes, “at the time it was the declared intention

TIgnor, “The Indianization,” 661.
This claim is detailed extensively in: Report, Curzon of Kedleson’s report on the Egyptian
Situation, The National Archives Website: Discovery, Cabinet 24/119/90, Description available at
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/D7737092 (accessed January 2018).
22 Tignor, Modernization, 21.
23 Daly, 240.
20
21
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of the British Government to evacuate the country as soon as these objects were
accomplished.”24 Hence, when the British increased their presence in the early twentieth
century under Lord Cromer, Egyptians professed frustration and resentment. As a result, a
nationalist movement accelerated in this period, advocating for an independent and selfgoverning nation and for the departure of British troops.
Egyptian nationalist thought had roots dating back to the early nineteenth century,
but historians conclude that it did not evolve into a mass movement until the early
twentieth century.25 The growth of the movement has been attributed to the death of
Khedive Muhammad Tawfiq in 1892 and the failure of Lord Cromer to reform Egypt’s
political sphere. Lord Cromer frequently condemned Khedive Muhammad Tawfiq’s
successor, his seventeen-year-old son. Lord Cromer harped on his inexperience and young
age to argue that British presence was necessary. His ridiculing statements became a focal
point for Egyptian opposition to the occupation. Egyptian nationalist leaders’ opposition
was evident in anti-British newspapers.26 Additionally, nationalist party leaders, such as
Mustafa Kamil and Ahmad Lufti al-Sayyid, began to emerge as prominent figures in
opposition to the British. Kamil and Lufti’s ideas became incredibly influential in
constructing an Egyptian national identity. They fostered a nationalist way of thinking
amongst Egyptians that strongly influenced the events of the 1919 revolution.

NA/CAB 24/117/49, Report of the Special Mission to Egypt 09 December, 1920, The National
Archives Website: Discovery, Description available at
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/D7736849, (accessed November 2017).
25 Tignor, Modernization, 148.
26 Daly, 241.
24
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Furthermore, historians refer to the early twentieth century as a “transitional phase
in the development of modern Egyptian political consciousness.”27 Egyptian political
consciousness was affirmed in their resentment towards Lord Cromer. Under Lord Cromer,
recommendations were ignored; measures were not taken to strengthen the constitution;
and there was no long-term plan for political reform. This caused the British administration
to be out of touch with the situation in Egypt and concluded that it was difficult for
Egyptians to support the British occupation when they felt disconnected from the
administrators governing their nation. Consequently, this led Egyptians to strengthen their
belief that they were capable of self-governing.
The Dinshawi incident of 1906 marked a watershed in modern Egyptian history
because of the mobilization of the labor class as part of the nationalist movement. In the
village of Dinshawi, an Egyptian woman was accidently shot and killed by a British officer
while pigeon hunting. This provoked Egyptian villagers to attack British officers in the
provinces, leaving one British officer dead. As a result, British authorities brought seven
Egyptian villagers to trial and prosecuted the accused on the grounds of premeditated
murder. Ultimately, seven Egyptian villagers were executed. 28 Egyptians viewed this
reprisal as savagely unjust and condemned British authorities for how they handled the
situation. Egyptians professed that it was not justifiable that seven Egyptians were brutally
executed for the death of one British official. 29 Nationalist leaders in the cities saw the
Dinshawi incident as an opportunity to capitalize on grievances in the provinces and
organize the working class against the British occupation. They utilized their position to

Ibd.
Baron, 28.
29 Daly, 243.
27
28
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strengthen their fight for national independence. Historians emphasize that the Dinshawi
incident was one of the most formative moments in the nationalist movement: “what began
as a minor fracas, and should have remained a routine police matter, ended as a twoheaded icon of Egyptian nationalist mythology and British imperialism.” 30 The incident was
a turning point for the nationalist movement because it realized that mass mobilization to
achieve independence was not only necessary but possible.
Following the Dinshawi incident, the nationalist movement recognized the
capability workers and peasants had to gain British attention. In efforts to organize a labor
party, nationalist leaders implemented formal organizations, such as schools and unions.
People’s Night Schools were created in the Higher School Club, which forged a network
between middle class activists and workers by providing instruction in literacy,
mathematics, language arts, social sciences, religion, and hygiene. 31 Additionally, the
“Manual Trades Workers’ Union” was established to provide organization to labor party
activism.32 These advancements marked the changing dynamic between urban and rural
populations during this period. Beinin states that the pre-war period was “a period of
embryonic development preceding and making possible the real birth of the movement in
1919” because “for the first time Egyptian workers emerged as the subjects of the historical
process and not only as its objects, as agents acting on their own behalf despite adverse
circumstances.”33 Historians characterize the period preceding the war to be imperative to
the success of the 1919 revolution because it saw the integration of peasants and laborers

Ibd.
Beinin, The Contemporary Middle East, 67.
32 Ibd, 68.
33 Ibd, 82.
30
31
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into the nationalist movement and the emergence of broad-based support for national
unity and independence.34
In December 1914, at the onset of World War I, Britain proclaimed a protectorate
over Egypt.35 Given the strategic importance of the Suez Canal, this was a way for the
British to secure their position in Egypt. With the protectorate, British officials vowed to
protect Egypt during the war and ensured that the protectorate was a developmental step
towards an independent Egypt. The British did not properly estimate how significantly the
war would affect their colonies, which caused the Egyptian nation to suffer immeasurably.
It also led to an increase of British troops, the requisitioning of labor and resources, and
inflated prices, which disproportionately affected the fellahin in the provinces. 36 Grievances
associated with the war caused the fellahin to suffer immensely, but because they thought
that the protectorate was a temporary wartime measure, they were hopeful that it would
be abolished after the war. Yet the war
impressed upon Britain the paramount strategic importance of Egypt, and any
political settlement with the Egyptian nationalists after the war had to be one that
did not jeopardize British strategic control of the area. 37
When the British government failed to abolish the protectorate after the war, the Egyptian
population, from cities to the countryside, was collectively outraged. While historians
regard the 1919 revolution as a predictable outcome, the British professed surprise.
The years subsequent to World War I placed the British empire in a complex
international context with the formation of the League of Nations, introduction of the

Ibd.
Vatikiotis, 251.
36 Ibd, 252.
37 NA/CAB 24/117/49.
34
35
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mandate system, and President Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ speech. The British empire was
under significant scrutiny in this period. The League of Nations was comprised of the
victors of World War I and sought to generate best practices of international governance.
The system fundamentally guaranteed the continuation of colonial rule and implemented
general guidelines for how to rule each country. 38 Simultaneously, President Wilson gave
his ‘Fourteen Points’ speech on January 8 th, 1918, that advocated for every nation’s right to
self-determination, which was overwhelmingly popular amongst colonial nations. 39 Thus,
the League of Nations had to carefully balance how the mandate system was introduced
and implemented in order to protect European interests in these countries. Under this new
pressure, the British had to be incredibly strategic about how they portrayed their position
in British colonies.
The British did not anticipate the enthusiasm with which their subjects internalized
President Wilson’s speech. In a telegram to Lord Allenby, Ayerst Henham Hooker, a British
expat in Egypt discloses:
The speeches of President Wilson have made a great impression on the minds of
agitators, and have stimulated them to immediate action. They thought that the
moment had arrived when they could make a combined movement with some
prospect of success.40
President Wilson’s speech fostered expectations of immediate action, which did not
materialize.41 In Egypt, President Wilson’s speech had given the nation hope that their goal
of self-governance was tangibly accessible. Furthermore, Egyptian nationalists were
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optimistic that President Wilson would hold true to his proclamations for selfdetermination and would not recognize the British protectorate. Yet, when the United
States acknowledged the protectorate in Egypt, the Egyptian nation felt betrayed. In The
Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial
Nationalism, Erez Manela argues:
the disillusionment that followed the collapse of this ‘Wilsonian moment’ fueled a
series of popular protest movements across the Middle East and Asia, heralding the
emergence of anticolonial nationalism as a major force in world affairs.42
Hence, when British officials decided to prohibit nationalist leader Saad Zaghlul from
attending the Paris Peace Conference, the nation responded with revolution. The 1919
Egyptian revolution was one of many upheavals that revealed the international dimensions
of anti-colonial nationalism.43
The British government sent a Special Mission to Egypt in 1921 to investigate the
causes of the revolution in 1919. The Mission hoped to clear up misconceptions about the
occupation and enhance the empire’s image by appearing to be concerned with the status
of Egyptians. The report was published in 1921 and put particular emphasis on the
situation of the fellahin during the war in order to address what made them impressionable
to nationalist agitation. The Mission discloses:
Unrest among the educated classes in Egypt was, as had already been pointed out,
manifest long before the crisis of 1919. But that it should have spread to the fellahin
and should have led to outbreaks of savage violence among a class, which has
derived such immense benefits from the British Occupation needs explaining. 44
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Correspondence in British official documents corroborates the Mission’s statement and
affirms that the British considered the mass mobilization of fellahin in the revolution
something that needed to be explained. These documents conclude that the obvious factors
that influenced the fellahin were: the recruiting for the Egyptian Labor and Camel
Transport Corps; the requisition of domestic animals; the requisition of cereals; the rise in
food prices; and the collection for the Red Cross Fund.45 The Mission perceives that “these
factors had contributed by the end of 1918 to create a condition of discontent and unrest
among the fellahin and some loss of confidence in the benefits of British administration.”46
Furthermore, the 1919 report, “Political Conditions in Provinces,” states, “the fellahin are
discontented because after many years of protection from exploitation they have been
seriously exploited during the war.”47 It was not, therefore, the declaration of the
protectorate or British wartime policies that were resented, but the way they were
implemented in Egypt.48
In 1914 Great Britain established the Egyptian Labor and Camel Transport Corps in
efforts to employ Egyptians in the war effort. The British recruited Egyptian laborers to
work for the British Army in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign. Their work supported the
logistical needs of the British army, such as railway construction and transporting supplies
on camelback. Wartime mobilization efforts were crucial for Great Britain to maintain its
position in the war. To recruit, British agents visited provinces and advertised the benefits
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of enlisting in the labor and transport corps for six months. 49 The British claimed to believe
that, for the fellahin, joining the Egyptian Labor and Camel Transport Corps was the
rational decision, and they perceived the first round of recruitment to have been successful.
In a telegram to Lord Allenby, Hooker, explains that “the men recruited had the time of
their lives, good pay, good food, clothing and infinitely better conditions than they had ever
experienced before.” 50 Hooker strategically highlights the perks of enlisting to affirm that
the British were providing the fellahin opportunities that would not exist without the
British occupation. He continues, “the wages paid were of great benefit to the poorer
classes of the population.”51 There was no doubt that the British saw the Egyptian Labor
and Camel Transport Corps as a golden opportunity for the fellahin, given “their readiness
to re-enlist again and again.” 52 According to the British, grievances did not arise until “the
voluntary system had ceased to supply a sufficient number of recruits,” causing
administrative pressure to become abusive.53
Press gang methods were apparently employed by the Omdeh (native officials) 54 to
recruit when the fellahin no longer voluntarily enlisted. The 1919 report, “Political
Conditions in Provinces,” explains, “enlistments to the E.LC. and C.T.C. were entirely in the
hands of the Omdeh who sold exemptions and enlisted their personal enemies. Men were
enlisted often after exemptions had been paid.” 55 In a letter to Lord Allenby, Reverend
Macintyre, a member of the Church Missionary, notes that he knows of a case “where a
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young man enlisted voluntarily for six months in Palestine, and the very day after his
return to his village was forced by threats to sign on again, and sent back at once.” 56 The
British perceived fellahin discontent to be with the conscription methods used by the
Omdeh, who were left unsupervised in the provinces. The war pulled experienced British
officials out of the provinces, giving the Omdeh the power to “take advantage of the
position, sending their enemies to serve, while letting off their friends and accepting bribes
for exemptions and substitutions.”57 The British consistently blamed the Omdeh for
employing press gang methods in the provinces, 58 but the mission admits that “British
pressure was asserted as the excuse for them.” 59 Consequently, it is not surprising that
British documents dissect the role of the Omdeh during the war to prove that these
grievances were not their fault. Hooker concludes that “great laxity was shown, in allowing
vast amount of unsupervised compulsory power to be placed in the hands of the rich and
unscrupulous provincial Omdeh.”60 It is important to note that this was “unsupervised”
power to deflect the blame on the greedy and corrupt Omdeh. The British believed that the
abuses were due to a lack of supervision and reported that grievances from the fellahin
were caused by the inability of British colonial administrators to regulate Omdeh power.
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In regard to the collection for the Red Cross Fund, reports suggested that the lack of
British authorities in the provinces allowed the Omdeh to take advantage of the fellahin
again. In a letter to Field Marshall Henry Wilson, Lord Allenby expresses that “collections
made, throughout the country, for the Red Cross Fund. This is a very real grievance.” 61 The
Mission professes that collections “intended to be voluntary, were in practice, frequently
made compulsory by officials seeking to acquire merit by the amounts which their districts
contributed.”62 Comparable to how British officials attributed involuntary Labor Corps
recruitment to the Omdeh, the Mission argues that the collections for the Red Cross were
supposed to be voluntary, yet again, due to lack of supervision the Omdeh took advantage
of their position of power. They conclude that this led to the belief that “only a portion of
the total amount collected reached its real destination.” 63 The British were scapegoating
Egyptians by insinuating that native Omdeh officials stole and forced contributions from
the poor fellahin, who were already suffering during the war. The Mission explains:
to entrust the collection to local Egyptian officials was inevitably to open the door to
abuses, entailing additional pressure on the poorer classes, with whom many other
circumstances made the war unpopular.64
It was beneficial to harp on the inadequacy of the Omdeh to secure their position in Egypt.
The British asserted the importance of colonial rule by blaming native officials for fellahin
grievances by portraying them as greedy and untrustworthy when not under the
supervision of the British.
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Reports also claim that British officials in the provinces were not cautious enough
when requisitioning materials for the war. 65 The Mission describes that “the fellahin were
most unwilling to part with their animals” and “often hardly hit by the removal of [their]
means to transport.”66 British officials did not feel that the requisition of animals was a
justified grievance because requisitions were “inevitable in a state of war.” 67 They
perceived that the grievance was that the British paid fair prices for animals at the start of
the war, but the prices for the Egyptians to buy them back at the end of the war were
significantly higher.68 Conversely, the Mission viewed the fellahin’s discontent concerning
the requisition of cereals to be more legitimate because they did not bear the blame. In the
requisitioning of cereals, “districts were assessed to furnish a given quantity, and the
collection was left to local officials, who derived large profits from the transaction.” 69 In the
case of wheat, the Omdeh collected larger quantities of wheat than required and profited
by selling them at higher market rates. If individuals were unable to meet the given wheat
quantity, they were forced to purchase their quota at market rates and return it for a lower
requisition rate. This caused the average consumption of wheat to drop drastically by 1918,
which led to shortages in the provinces and the cities. Ultimately, the British concluded that
the Omdeh made huge profits, while the fellahin continued to suffer. For example, the
report, “The Present Situation and Its Difficulties,” claims:
The recent phenomenal increase of wealth in Egypt is not only precarious itself, but
its benefits are mainly confined to one class, the landowners, great and small. On the
other hand, the landless portion of the peasantry and the lower orders of the towns

NA/FO 141/521/4.
NA/CAB 24/117/49, 11.
67 NA/CAB 24/117/49, 11.
68 NA/CAB 24/117/49, 11.
69 NA/CAB 24/117/49, 11.
65
66

27

are suffering terribly from the scarcity of essential food stuffs and the rise of
prices.70
The Mission argues, “the local officials were mainly responsible for the abuses which
occurred, but they were attributed to the British, who, under the exceptional conditions
prevailing, were unable to control them.”71 Not only did the Mission blame the Omdeh for
this grievance, but they used the war as an excuse for not controlling the situation in the
provinces. It was necessary to assert that the war caused “exceptional conditions” that they
“were unable to control” to argue that this was not the normal happenstance in Egypt.
Sir Thomas Russell Pasha72, a police officer in the Egyptian service, recounts fellahin
grievances in his autobiography, Egyptian Service. He describes that the fellah
was forced to give up his donkey and his camel, without which he could not
transport his produce. True, a fair price was fixed by the Army, but by the time it
reached him much had stuck to other fingers. In any case no money could
compensate for the loss of his beasts of burden, which were irreplaceable and his
resentment against the British grew till it reached a burning heat when his cereal
and other crops were also commandeered.73
Based on Russell Pasha’s claim, the British perceived that the grievance was that the
fellahin felt robbed by the British Army and deceived by how requisitions were carried out.
They concluded that the fellahin held the British accountable for their suffering during the
war because they had been assured they would be protected by the British. Russell Pasha
argues that “it must have been very hard during the First World War for the fellah of an
Egyptian village to understand what was going on in the world outside Egypt.”74 He
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continues that “as the war went on, he found more and more being demanded of him by
these same British for reasons that he was incapable of appreciating.” 75 It can be suggested
that Russell Pasha’s autobiography was intended for an international audience that
understood the scope of World War I. Thus, it was advantageous to portray the fellahin as
ignorant about the consequences of war and disconnected. He insinuates that if the fellahin
understood the complexity of World War I, they would recognize the necessity of
requisitioning materials for wartime measures.
Food shortages caused by wartime measures also hit the fellahin class hard. 76 This
occurred because of the excess of food exports for the war, inflated prices, and the
requisition of local food and resources. 77 Additionally, the war affected the international
economy and the state’s manipulation of resources exacerbated the food shortages. 78 In
Egypt, the fellahin suffered the consequence of inflation on everyday necessities, such as
“corn, clothing, and fuel.”79 The Mission explains that “a family of four – a man, his wife and
two small children – could not, at the beginning of 1919, obtain a sufficiency of food except
at a cost which considerably exceeded the ordinary rate of wages.” 80 British reports state
that the fellahin’s wages were insufficient to meet the cost of standard living, and the
progressive rise of prices throughout the war gave the fellahin reason to fear they would
starve. Additionally, British reports suggest that while the fellahin continued to struggle,
“they saw a limited number of their countrymen and the unpopular foreigner making large
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fortunes.”81 According to Reverend Macintyre, this led the fellahin to believe that “get rid of
the English and all our troubles will cease.” 82 By contrast, the British argued that it was not
their presence, but wartime conditions, that caused problems for the fellahin and made
them vulnerable to nationalist propaganda. 83
When the war ended in 1918, Britain did not abolish the protectorate because it was
imperative to protect Britain’s essential interests in Egypt, first and foremost the
maintenance of imperial communications through the Suez Canal.84 The Mission explains
that the Egyptians hoped Britain would dissolve the protectorate because they had viewed
it as a temporary wartime measure. This idea was rooted in their understanding “that
efforts would be made at the end of the war to satisfy their national aspirations.”85 Indeed,
continued British presence in Egypt was met with severe hostility from nationalist party
leaders, such as Saad Zaghlul. Zaghlul had been an active member in the nationalist party
since the beginning of the British occupation and was characterized as the lead “agitator” in
the nationalist movement. 86 Directly following the war, Zaghlul requested permission to
travel to Paris to advocate for total Egyptian independence. The report, “Indian and
Egyptian Conspirators in England and the Remedy,” proclaims that Zaghlul
now makes a great point of ‘having waited till the Allies had won the war and signed
the Armistice’ before beginning to agitate. Without open incitements to revolt,
however, he succeeded, during the four years of war, in making very thorough
preparations for a rising, and as soon as the Armistice was signed he demanded the
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right to go to Paris with a mandate from the people, to claim complete independence
for Egypt.87
The international climate following the war and heightened focus on the status of imperial
nations had fostered hope amongst Egyptians that independence was a feasible goal. 88
Zaghlul’s request was denied because his persistent nature and ability to rally Egyptians
against the protectorate was perceived to be the root of the chaos. It can also be suggested
that British officials denied his request because he would be a bad reflection of the empire’s
work in Egypt at the Paris Peace Conference. This decision was met with severe backlash
from the Egyptian population and Zaghlul “became more and more truculent in his
demands and language and began to organize a widespread rebellion.” 89 Consequently,
British officials decided to arrest and deport Zaghlul and his associates to the British
colony, Malta. The British expressed that they hoped this would put an end to the disorder
in Egypt.90 Instead, this resulted in a mass movement of the Egyptian people. 91
To the British’s surprise, the week following their arrest, demonstrations broke out
in the cities, which quickly spread to the provinces. This sparked a revolution amongst the
Egyptian nation that “was a national movement backed by the sympathy of all classes and
creeds among this Egyptian population.”92 British official documents put emphasis on
events in the provinces because they quickly escalated into a brutal revolt within the week.
They explain:
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By the 14th and 15th March trouble had spread to most of the Delta provinces, where
attempts to interrupt communication had become general. On the 16 th the railway
and telegraphic communication between Cairo and the delta, as well as with Upper
Egypt was broken. By the 18th the provinces of Behera, Gharbia, Menufia and
Dakkhalia were in a state of open revolt. 93
Thus, the Mission admits that “the consequences of deporting the Nationalist leaders were
not rightly estimated.” 94 Hooker explains to Lord Allenby that “what was not expected was
the careful and extensive preparation of the movement, which included Moslems, Copts
and Bedouins, not to mention practically the whole Agricultural population.”95 Their
reaction to the 1919 revolution suggests that because Britain ruled through divide and rule
tactics, they were not prepared for a unified response and considered it an anomaly.
Hooker affirms this and states “it is the first time in modern Egyptian history that the whole
of the native population has co-operated in a political movement.” 96 British officials’
reaction indicated that they saw the fellahin sector of society to be isolated from nationalist
propaganda in the cities. This was a convenient perception because it helped them make
the case for the benefits of the protectorate. 97 Yet, the fellahin’s participation in the revolt
suggested that the British underestimated their political consciousness.
British reports produced after the 1919 revolution assess its causes and primarily
focus on fellahin grievances during the war, ignoring a much longer history of resistance to
the occupation. While the Dinshawi incident in 1906 was smaller scale than the revolution
of 1919, both mobilizations crossed sectors of society. Despite this history, in a letter to
Field Marshall Wilson, Lord Allenby states, “for the first time since 1882 they are against
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us. Previously, the fellahin have been our friends.”98 It was beneficial to portray the fellahin
to be supporters of the occupation, victims of corrupt Egyptian officials, and lackeys of
urban nationalist leaders. Further, the British used divide and rule tactics in Egypt to avoid
a similar situation that happened in India. The report, “Indian and Egyptian Conspirators in
England and the Remedy,” describes “the details of the rising are too well known to need
repetition. It bears many points of resemblance to the beginning of the Indian Mutiny.” 99 As
a result, British officials attempted to isolate the fellahin through divide and rule tactics to
avoid a similar situation in Egypt. Yet their participation in the revolution revealed that
these tactics had failed because Egyptians were actually significantly more unified in their
perception and rejection of colonialism than the British understood or were prepared to
admit.
The image of the isolated and ignorant fellahin appears throughout the Special
Mission report and British official documents. The Mission asserts that during the 1919
revolution “the disorders were confined to the neighborhood or large centers and to
districts along the main lines of communication,” 100 while “in remoter villages, less readily
accessible to propagandists and agitators, little disposition was shown by the small farmers
to take part in any such movement.”101 It seems to have been important to insist that a
sector of the fellahin population did not participate in the revolt in order to justify the
British imperial project in Egypt. They divided the fellahin population based on
geographical location to explain why certain sectors participated in the revolt. The
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disturbances that took place near lines of communication occurred because the British
perceived they were able to access cities, which were the centers of unrest. This suggested
that the British did not believe the fellahin would have acted independently. They
consistently blamed “agitators” in the cities for fueling fellahin resentment towards the
British. Hooker affirms that “the nationalist leaders made the most of the growing
discontent, and at once started propaganda that would appeal to the passions and
prejudices of the fellahin.”102 Their participation in the revolution implies that the fellahin
were not as ignorant or isolated as the British perceived. It also suggested that the stark
social divisions described in British official documents were not the reality in Egypt.
The British insisted on these divisions because they were useful in legitimizing
British wartime strategy and ongoing occupation. Given the unrest in the cities, it was
expedient to focus on the fellahin’s dependence on British support and their alleged
victimization or brainwashing by other sectors of Egyptian society. Indeed, throughout
British official documents, the British portrays the fellahin to be the principal supporters
and beneficiaries of the occupation. For example, the foreign office report “The Present
Situation and Its Difficulties,” states:
There is no general hostility to the British amongst the fellahin or smaller
landowners. Any manifestations of such hostility have been due to the influence of
Nationalist emissaries from the towns, exploiting religious feeling or temporary
grievance connected with the war.103
The British did not take responsibility for the grievances they caused, but instead blamed
the Omdeh for abusing power and mistreating the fellahin. This is evident in the Mission’s
depiction of wartime grievances They portray wartime measures, such as the Egyptian
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Labor and Camel Transport Corps, as profitable opportunities. Therefore, they attribute the
fellahin’s grievances to British officials’ disappearance from the provinces, which made the
fellahin more susceptible to abuse by native authorities. 104 The Mission concludes:
those unfortunate incidents of the war period, to which we have already alluded,
shook for a time their confidence in our justice and good-will, and were
predisposing causes of the savage outbreak of anti-British feeling in the spring of
1919.105
Therefore, it was the “unfortunate incidents of the war period” that caused the fellahin to
resent the British occupation because they had failed to act as their protectors. 106
Moreover, the British maintains that “agitation among the fellahin was of a far more partial
character than has been generally supposed.”107 Nonetheless, by painting this as a turning
point, they were able to admit that the fellahin were far less isolated and ignorant than they
presumed. 108
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Chapter 2: Women
Based on the feminist activism that occurred over the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, it is hard to believe that the participation of women in the 1919
revolution came as a surprise to the British. Their astonishment indicated that the British
believed their attempts to narrow education opportunities would keep women isolated
from the nationalist movement. Egyptian women’s participation in the movement revealed
their discontent with the occupation and further threatened the security of the empire. For
that reason, the British had to defend the occupation and portrayed Egyptian women to be
unintelligent, ignorant, and powerless by playing on gender stereotypes to justify the need
for continued British presence. In British official documents, the British constantly harp on
the constraints of the Islamic religion on women to explain their lack of attention to female
reforms during the occupation. Similar to the portrayal of the fellahin, British officials
downplayed women’s participation in the revolution because it was essential to maintain
that Egyptians were disunited, backwards, and ill-prepared for self-rule in the international
context after the war. Additionally, an international feminist movement was rapidly
spreading across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, which made it imperative for the
British to justify their treatment of women to audiences at home and abroad. Already in the
early years of the occupation, British officials narrowed educational opportunities for
women and sought to undermine the feminist movement by dividing women by class,
occupation, and residence. At the same time, they claimed to be doing everything they
could to improve the status of Egyptian women.
Prior to the occupation, an Egyptian feminist consciousness had existed alongside
the nationalist movement in the late nineteenth century. The British constantly took credit
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for the emergence of an Egyptian feminist movement in British official documents, yet
historiography reveals that its origins dated to before the occupation. Over the course of
Muhammad Ali’s reign in Egypt (1805-48), efforts were made to modernize Egypt through
industrial, education, social, and technology reforms. 109 In particular, these reforms
opened new opportunities for upper- and middle-class Egyptian women.110 For example,
the school for midwives opened in 1832 and the first girls’ state school was established in
1837. Muhammad Ali also permitted tutors to teach in women’s homes, which fostered an
educated class of Egyptian women. The results of Muhammad Ali’s female education
reforms became visible in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when Egyptian
women began to teach in schools and publish books, journals, and articles. 111
The role of the Egyptian women’s press played an integral role in the construction of
the feminist national identity alongside the Egyptian nationalist movement. Although
women’s journals had existed, historians mark 1907 as a turning point for women
periodicals because of the effect their publications had on the British occupation. Following
the Dinshawi incident in 1906, the women’s press became exceedingly vocal against the
British occupation. For example, Fatima Rashid established the Jam’iyyat Tarqiyat al-Mar’a
(The Society for Women’s Progress) and began holding meetings in her home to discuss the
status of Muslim women in Egypt. Jam’iyyat Tarqiyat al-Mar’a published articles that
advocated for female rights and backed the nationalist party’s efforts. 112 In reaction to the
Dinshawi incident, they published articles that condemned the British authorities for their
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harsh and unjust treatment towards Egyptian villagers and portrayed British officials in the
provinces as savage colonists. Through these publications, a relationship formed between
feminists and nationalist leaders. Egyptian women’s stern opposition to the British
occupation in their journals impressed upon the nationalist party the importance of
championing women’s rights as part of their campaign against the British occupation.
Beinin affirms this claim and states:
elite men and women began to encourage the women’s awakening - education of
women and their entry into white-collar professions (at least until marriage or after
widowhood), and the formation of women’s social and political organizations - as
expressions of a national revival.113
With the support of Egyptian men, Egyptian women took on new roles in society.
In the early twentieth century, Egyptian women began convening discretely in
segregated public spaces. Upper- and middle-class Egyptian women became headmasters
and teachers in the new Egyptian University in 1908, held female lectures, and established
philanthropic societies.114 Emerging feminist leader, Huda Sha’rawi, held lectures at the
Egyptian University that encouraged women to pursue higher education degrees and new
careers, and pushed women to challenge societal traditions, such as the veil. In 1909 Huda
Sha’rawi founded the first female philanthropic society, Mabarrat Muhammad Ali.
Mabarrat Muhammad Ali functioned as a medical center for lower-class Egyptian women
and introduced women’s health care to poor Egyptian communities. Historians emphasize
that organizations such as, Mabarrat Muhammad Ali, allowed Egyptian women to gain
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organizational and management experience that was integral in preparing them for the
1919 revolution. 115
Feminist activity at the turn of the century was less visible to the British because it
had been occurring in private and segregated spaces. Yet in the early twentieth century
Egyptian women confidently entered the public sphere to join causes with the nationalist
movement. In The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem, Matiel Mogannam describes,
“Egypt can now boast of many women writers and reformers who have won for themselves
a world-wide reputation. Even in the political field these ladies have proved to be an
invaluable asset to their country.”116 For example, in 1909 Egyptian women were asked to
join the British Lady Cromer society, but declined the offer on nationalist grounds. 117
Instances like this revealed that Egyptian women demanded their civil rights through the
nationalist platform. In 1910, Egyptian feminist, Inshira Shawqi voiced her support for the
nationalist movement in a letter read by the congress chairman at the Nationalist Congress
in Brussels. 118 Present or not, Egyptian women were publically voicing their support for
the nationalist movement. A year later, in 1911 Egyptian women entered the public sphere
when Egyptian feminist, Malak Hifini Nasif, attended the all-male nationalist meeting of the
Egyptian Congress in Egypt to publically voice feminist demands. This marked a watershed
in Egyptian feminist history, as women advocated for their rights in a male forum.
Now that Egyptian women had entered the public sphere and voiced their support
for the nationalist movement, the British became concerned with the condition of Egyptian
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women in the early twentieth century. In “Competing, Overlapping, and Contradictory
Agendas: Egyptian Education Under British Occupation, 1882-1922,” Mona Russell
describes that “the British in general, and Cromer, in particular, used the ‘lowly’ position of
women in Egypt as a justification for the occupation.” 119 The British constantly connected
the status of women to the advancement of Egyptian society to justify the need for colonial
rule. Lord Cromer concluded that the only way to enhance Egyptian women’s position was
through education reforms. 120 It was advantageous for Cromer to boast about the lowly
status of Egyptian women and champion the Egyptian feminist movement because it
justified the British occupation. He constantly professed that the status of Egyptian women
had been neglected until the British intervened and credited the British for any instance of
female advancement. While Lord Cromer advocated that female education reforms would
elevate the lowly status of women, the British in fact narrowed education opportunities by
refining the curriculum to be focused on teaching domesticity for women. British
documents reveal that under the British, government run schools taught cooking, laundry,
ironing, and sewing, which they professed was a more practical use of female education. 121
Conversely, Mona Russell describes that Egyptian women “viewed the entrance of such
subjects in the curriculum with disdain”122 and concludes that “it is clear that the
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overweening push to domesticity was neither popular nor efficient.” 123 It is evident that the
British administration narrowed education reforms to keep them isolated from the
nationalist movement and evolving international feminist movement. Their apparent
support for Egyptian women was a façade to enhance their stance with the British
suffragette movement and image as a colonial power.
The end of World War I generated an international discussion about the status of
colonial nations and how they were governed. A main concern of these discussions was the
status of colonial women. Countless articles, periodicals, and reports that discussed the
status of women in British colonies circulated in Europe. Historians suggest that colonial
women were such a focal point because of the emerging international feminist
movement.124 In particular, attention was drawn to the prevalence of feminist movements
in Middle Eastern countries. This was evident in Iran, Palestine, and India. 125 In regard to
the British empire, women’s rights were a debated topic due to the development of the
British women’s suffragette movement in the twentieth century. Therefore, when Egyptian
women participated in the 1919 revolution, the British empire had to carefully construe a
narrative that downplayed women’s participation and was favorable of the occupation.
After the war, colonial support groups emerged in England that criticized British
ruling tactics used in British colonies. These groups made claims that accused British
officials of abusing colonial women, which were troublesome because this degraded the
empire’s reputation. British officials often referred to these groups as “conspirators” and
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expressed fear of them plotting to stir up domestic and colonial disturbances. 126 For
example, the Egyptian Association in Great Britain was a support group based in London
that was vocally opposed to the occupation. Their mission was to voice Egyptian grievances
and bring attention to the unjust continuation of the protectorate following the war. After
British officials denied Egypt the right to speak on their own behalf at the Paris Peace
Conference, the Egyptian Association in Great Britain submitted a petition on behalf of the
Egyptian people, stating that recognition of the British protectorate would be “a complete
violation of his well-known principles of justice and fair play to the weak as well as the
strong nations.”127 Given that British censorship laws prohibited Egyptians from freely
publishing articles, the Egyptian Association in Great Britain used their domestic platform
to speak on behalf of Egyptians.
In May of 1919 the Egyptian Association addressed a letter to the British
government in regard to the conduct of the British military in Egyptian provinces. The
letter is written by the Egyptian Association’s secretary, H.Y. Awad, and includes a report of
the Giza Provincial Council provided by Mr. Tadros J. Makar 128 that accuses British military
authorities of committing gross atrocities against Egyptians. Awad exclaims, “we appeal to
all Englishmen who love the fair name of their country to remain unstained, who are proud
of the British traditions and who believe in justice and fair play to come in our help.”129 He

For further descriptions of this see NA/CAB 24/83/56.
Egyptian Association in Great Britain to U.S. Ambassador in Paris, 25 April 1919, USNA, RG 256,
883.00/114.
128 NA/ FO 608/214/1, Statements and letters by the Egyptian Association of Great Britain outlining
Egyptian aspirations and condemning British military rule, Foreign Office Papers on Egypt: Social
Unrest. The letter states that “the following are extracts from the report of the Giza Provincial
Council supplied to us by Mr. Tadros I. Makar who has just returned from Egypt.”
129 NA/FO 608/214/1.
126
127

42

suggests that if Englishmen did not accept his appeal, the country’s reputation could be
tarnished. Awad goes on to cite examples that stressed the mistreatment of women and
arbitrary brutality. For instance, he describes, “villages [that] have been bombed and raised
to the ground. Women and children being slain while these repressive measures were
being carried out and peaceful demonstrators have been fired upon with machine guns.” 130
Awad’s depictions portrays British soldiers as savagely and unjustly attacking Egyptians.
Similar claims are made in the report itself, dated April 9 th, 1919. This report
includes council members’ description of atrocities committed by the British military in the
Giza provinces during the revolution. A member recounts his experience:
My wife and three daughters (the eldest of whom is only eight years old) were
terrified and got under the bed-steads. The soldiers entered my wife’s room and
dragged her out by her hair. They did the same to my children. The earrings of my
children were forcibly snatched from their ears tearing the flesh. My wife’s necklace
and bracelets, too, were snatched away inflicting cuts on the neck and hands. Then
the troops ransacked my house taking over three hundred pounds from my safe as
well as the remainder of my wife’s jewelry tearing up all my valuable papers; then
they ordered us out of the house which they then set on fire. 131
He concludes by observing that troops
tore the clothes of the women insulting them by touching their naked bodies; this
sight was too much for me and I was overcome. I have not the slightest doubt that
unfortunate women had suffered the disgrace of the violation of their honor.” 132
His statements are filled with emotion. From stripping women of their jewelry to tearing
off their clothes and touching their bodies, the assault on the women of the provinces
clearly crossed a line for the council members. It also appears to have crossed a line for the
British government. These accusations posed a serious threat given the current domestic
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and international contexts. With the British suffragette and Egyptian nationalist movement
working to spread awareness about the condition of colonial women, this report focusing
on the treatment of Egyptian women was source of serious concern. It also had the ability
to stir up further nationalist unrest Egypt, direct additional scrutiny to the actions of the
British military in other colonies, and tarnish the reputation of the British empire in the
League of Nations. As well, the accusations made in this report bear resemblance to claims
made following the Dinshawi incident. 133 Once again, this report degrades British troops by
portraying their behavior as savage and merciless. In this complex context it was
imperative that the British government defend itself against these accusations.
In “Parliamentary Debates: Official Report constituted between May 19th to June 6 th
1919,” the coalition government and principal officers of the House of Commons discuss
concerns about the Egyptian Association in Great Britain’s allegations about British troops.
Foremost, committee members ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what
measures would be taken to cease further publications from this group. Sir John Butcher
(1st Baron Danesfort, Conservative Party politician) askes, “whether he [Secretary of State
for the Home Department] will take immediate steps to prevent the further publication of
this circular and to bring those responsible for its publication to justice.” 134 Major Earl
Winterton (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Conservative Party politician) also asks if
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any action has been taken against any person or persons resident in the Imperial
Hotel, who have been issuing circulars, on behalf of an organization calling itself the
Egyptian Association, reflecting on the honor of our troops in Egypt? 135
These statements insinuate that members of Parliament were more concerned with
stopping these publications than the accusations they made. One motive for stopping these
publications was the growing international suffragette movement. Thus, Parliament
members were specifically attentive to accusations about the treatment of women.
Parliament members also attempt to deflect blame onto non-white (colonial) troops
in the British empire by clearly differentiating them from British troops. Sir Charles Yate
(1st Baronet, Conservative Party politician) questions “what was the nationality of those
troops?”136 Lieutenant-Colonel Guinness (1st Baron Moyne, Conservative Party politician)
answers, “does the hon. Member think that British white troops would drag women out of
their beds by the hair of their heads? Does he seriously think that?” 137 These statements
suggest that Sir Charles Yate and Lieutenant-Colonel Guinness are trying to lay the blame
on non-white subjects of the British empire. 138 This emphasis on the “white troops” implies
that someone of their race would never commit this crime. It is also likely that these nonwhite troops were Indian, given the number of Indian troops conscripted into the British
army during World War I. These statements play one colonized group off of another,
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another example of British using divide and rule tactics to deflect blame. Parliament
members continue to defend British troops by describing the apparent absurdity of these
accusations. Captain Frederick Guest (Chief Whip of Prime Minister, David Lloyd George)
explains:
General Allenby reports that a press campaign of this kind was evidently being
worked up by agitators, probably with a view to assisting the Nationalist campaign
in Paris. He has also reported that the troops showed most praiseworthy restraint,
often under great provocation. 139
This assertion insinuates that this type of press campaign could only be worked up by
agitators. Given the repetition of the term “agitator” in British official documents, it can be
suggested that parliament members wanted to convey that unrest was confined to a small
sector of the population. Additionally, by praising the British troops’ apparent self-control,
he portrays Egyptians as insubordinate and unruly. He continues:
In a few cases, where a search for arms had to be made at night, portions of certain
villages were accidentally set on fire, and women were naturally frightened, but no
more. It must be remembered that Egyptian villages are made of mud with roofs or
dry cotton stalks, and fires are always of frequent occurrence. 140
Captain Guest’s statement is a stark contrast to the Egyptian Association’s portrayal of this
event. He deflects the blame from British troops by representing Egyptian villages as
primitive and dangerous places, where “frightening” fires were “of frequent occurrence.”
He concludes that, “to anyone who knows British and Colonial troops, and the standard of
discipline in Indian units, the suggestion that they would maltreat women is manifestly
absurd.”141 Captain Guest dismissal of the accusations as “absurd” simultaneously paints
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the Egyptian Association as fanciful and defended the British empire, including its
composite military made up of significant numbers of Indian troops, as beyond reproach.
Comparably, Russell Pasha defends allegations of police brutality towards women.
British troops and police authorities fell under significant scrutiny because of the harsh
enforcement methods they used against Egyptian protestors over the course of the
revolution. At this point, Egyptians had become internationally vocal – from demanding
their right to attend the Paris Peace Conference to working closely with other colonial
nations to fight oppressive ruling tactics. As the commandant of the Cairo Police, Russell
Pasha was responsible for maintaining order in Cairo and shutting down protestors. Under
domestic pressure to keep the peace in the colonies, it was extremely important to
vindicate police tactics during the revolution. He describes the difficulty of dealing with
women protestors because “stopping a procession means force and any force you use to
women puts you in the wrong.”142 Egyptian women’s participation in the movement was
problematic for the police force because if they mishandled the situation, it could stir up
more domestic and international agitation. He also uses gender stereotypes to insinuate
that male police will always be in the wrong when handling disobedient women. He
explains:
at a given signal I closed the cordon and all the ladies found their way opposed by a
formidable line of Egyptian conscript police, who had been previously warned that
they were to use no violence but to stand still and, if necessary, let their faces be
scratched by irate finger-nails.143
Russell Pasha defends his position as police commander by establishing that he informed
police officials to not use violence, while simultaneously portraying Egyptian women to be
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inherent savages. He mocks the demonstration by implying that the most harm Egyptian
women could cause the police was scratching their faces. This demeans the legitimacy of
the women’s demonstrations by ridiculing their mechanism of attack.
Russell Pasha further scorns upper-class women’s demonstrations in a letter
written to his father during the 1919 revolution. He patronizes the women’s
demonstrations and emphasizes that their participation brought “a note of comedy” to the
alarming revolution.144 He continues,
the idea of being attacked by what they [British police] considered to be extremely
immodest females amused my men enormously and considerable license was given
them by their officers to practice their ready peasant wit on the smart ladies who
confronted them. 145
Russell Pasha’s tone is extremely condescending. He suggests that his officers would be
able to easily outsmart Egyptian women with “their ready peasant wit.” 146 Russell Pasha
consistently asserts that Egyptians were inherently unruly to secure Britain’s position.
Similar to how members of parliament portrayed the Egyptian Association in Great
Britain’s accusations to be absurd, Russell Pasha does the same to protect the reputation of
British officials in the complex international and colonial context.
Russell Pasha continues to express contempt for their demonstrations in his
description of encounters with Egyptian feminists to highlight the anomaly of their
involvement. These statements are another example of British divide and rule tactics; the
British wanted to portray women to be indifferent to, or even in favor of, their occupation
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and thus it was essential to explain away their apparent participation in the revolution. He
recounts:
I happened to have a previous acquaintance with this very modern young Egyptian
woman, who was much in advance of her time in every respect and was by no
means bien vue by the best families. I intentionally addressed myself to her and thus
very soon roused the jealousy of other equally smart and beautiful ladies in the
procession, who all wanted to talk at the same time and who much resented the
assumption by this particular young woman of the position of Generalissima.
Russell Pasha’s description of this woman as “in advance of her time” and “modern”
suggests that this was a rarity for Egyptian women. He plays on gender stereotypes by
emphasizing how easy it was to excite and distract other woman by his presence and
implies that Egyptian women were not actually concerned with protesting. He continues:
I found the poor dears in a sorry condition. It was a hot summer’s day. The street to
which I had penned them had no shade from the pitiless sun and there was nowhere
to sit except upon the hot curb-stones. Some of the more stalwart tried a few more
arguments as I apologized for having been so long in bringing them the General’s
final decision that no procession could be allowed, but it was clear that the majority
were beat to the world with their complexions ruined by the sun and their feet
blistered by the hot pavement and unaccustomed exercise. 147
Once again, Russell Pasha’s sexist demeanor is evoked in his portrayal of the Egyptian
women’s demonstrations. He focuses on their physicality by reflecting on how the sun
affected their appearance and yet again emphasizes the anomaly of this situation by stating
that they were “beat to the world” and not used to exercise. Furthermore, it is evident that
Russell Pasha wants to highlight the backwardness of Egyptian society by harping on the
fact that women were not used to being outdoors because of the constraints of the Islamic
religion. He concludes that after he shut down their demonstration, “everyone was
relieved: the ladies were relieved and even thanked me.” 148 Russell Pasha portrays himself,
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and by extension the British empire, as the women’s savior. With each claim made, he
belittles Egyptian women’s activism and establishes that the British presence was not only
essential to maintaining order, but also beneficial to Egyptian women.
Similarly, in the Special Mission to Egypt report, the British lament the ignorance of
Egyptian women and boast about how they reformed the educational system to help them.
The British used female education to justify the need for their occupation. The report states
that the largest concern was the prevailing illiteracy amongst Egyptian women and
concludes that “the education of Egyptian women is as yet merely in an initial stage.”149 The
illiteracy rates are highlighted to portray Egyptian women to be behind in comparison to
European women and provide an explanation for why girls’ schools were less well-funded
than boys’ schools. The report describes two distinct school systems for girls – the
“Vernacular” and the “Europeanized.”150 The “Vernacular” schools were referred to as
“Maktabs” and were focused on teaching children the Quran by memorization. The report
explains that in 1897 these Maktabs were “under no form of supervision or control,
attended by some 3,000 girls and 173,000 boys.”151 The conditions are described as
“hopeless at the time” and the teachers as “illiterate and incompetent.” 152 Yet, according to
the report, when the British-controlled Ministry of Education intervened and brought the
Maktabs under their supervision, substantial reforms were made. Once again this implies
that Egyptians were incapable of running schools until the British intervened and helped
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reform the system. The Mission reports that in regard to female education “much has been
done to make the education given in these Maktabs of real practical use to the pupils.
Regular instruction in needlepoint and hygiene is now given in all of them, with most
satisfactory results.”153 Female education reforms boasted about in this report actually
narrowed opportunities for women. Russell mentions in her article, that Egyptian women
strongly disproved of domestic reforms because they captured the “gender-based
differences”154 of male and female education under British authority. Rather than offer girls
and boys the same curriculum, girls’ education was extremely gender specific to keep them
isolated out of the work force. British officials wanted to receive credit for modernizing
schools, but also wanted to limit opportunities for different segments of the Egyptian
population. This was done to isolate Egyptian women from the evolving international
feminist and domestic nationalist movements with the hopes that they would remain “in
their place” and refrain from participating in any political movements.
The Chief Lady Medical Officer of Girls’ Schools, Mrs. Elgood, submitted a report in
June of 1920 that further reveals that British officials wanted to isolate Egyptian women by
suppressing education reforms. Like the conclusions reached by the Special Mission to
Egypt, Mrs. Elgood argues that one of the largest problems in girls’ schools was inadequate
teachers. She asserts:
teaching is a profession and no lady, in the Muslim mind, should have a profession.
In Primary schools the Egyptian teachers are not ladies, being for the most part the
clever daughters of humble government employees. It may even be said that a
woman’s chances of marriage were definitely damaged if she becomes a teacher. 155
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Just as British officials had blamed the Omdeh in the provinces for the abuses of the
fellahin, Mrs. Elgood blames the Muslim religion for the shortage of teachers. She suggests
that if women had freedom to pursue a profession, like European women, more Egyptian
women would be educated. Mrs. Elgood also explains that “Mohammedanism, however,
tactically obstructs progress of education among women.” 156 Apparent customs of the
Muslim religion were used as an excuse for the low literacy rates and to silence the feminist
nationalists who had strongly advocated for female education. This was extremely
convenient because the British wanted to portray Egyptian women as “backwards” in order
to justify their occupation. Dwelling on Egyptian backwardness was a political tactic to
obstruct Egyptian women from modernizing, without taking the blame.
Mrs. Elgood further deflects the responsibility for reforming female schools by
implying that Egyptian women were inherently incapable of achieving a higher intellectual
status. Once again, the British played on gender stereotypes. Mrs. Elgood reports:
when she visited Egyptian ladies, or met them in trams and railway carriages, no
woman was ever seen reading a newspaper. Their conversation was confined to the
subjects of cotton, jewelry, clothes, etc. The great tendency was for women to get
carried away by their emotions and this was the force which would always have to
be reckoned with. 157
She undermines female education by characterizing upper-class Egyptian women to be
uninterested because their emotions overtook their brains. This implies that no matter
what attempts British officials made to reform female education, Egyptian women would
be uninterested in anything but the most frivolous of topics.
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Because of this, she suggests that education reforms needed to focus on girls
learning practical skills, rather than math and science like the boys. Her report advises that
upper-class girls should be taught French rather than English because “it would be more
useful to them…if they were to learn French, as that is the language of most of their dress
makers, hair dressers, etc., etc.”158 Mrs. Elgood implies that Egyptian women were
uninterested in intellectually stimulating subjects and only concerned with feminine
upkeep. Moreover, recommending that Egyptian women not be taught English, the
language of their colonizer, limits their ability to follow political developments. While Mrs.
Elgood presents these recommendations as practical, they in fact narrowed opportunities
for Egyptian women. Nonetheless, it is evident the British wanted these reforms to appear
as attempts to improve women’s status.
In terms of women in the provinces, the report explains that “as far as education
among the lower classes is concerned, the daughter of a fellah hardly ever goes to school:
they are quite illiterate and blissfully happy.”159 Throughout British official documents, the
fellahin are constantly portrayed as content and isolated from the rest of society. The
division of women by class further reflects British official’s attempts to divide and rule the
Egyptian population. British assertions about female education in Egypt demonstrate that
they actively narrowed educational opportunities out of fear that such opportunities would
lead to increased participation in the nationalist movement and resistance to the British
occupation. As Lord Cromer had warned in 1908, “whatever we do, education must
produce its natural results, and one of these natural results, both in India and Egypt, will be
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the wish to get rid of the foreigner.”160 British officials had introduced a westernized
education system and literacy program in India, which the British concluded resulted in the
distaste of British presence. 161 The British wanted to prevent the same thing from
happening in Egypt.
British officials’ portrayal of Egyptian women further supports the argument that
the British were still clinging to the hope that dividing Egyptian society would prolong their
colonial occupation after World War I. Comparable to the portrayal of the fellahin, British
officials attempted to depict Egyptian women as inherently ignorant and either indifferent
to or content with the occupation. British officials constantly harped on the constraints of
Islamic religion and played on gender stereotypes to assert the importance of a colonial
presence in Egypt. The extent to which they attempted to belittle women’s participation in
the revolution and isolated all Egyptian women by narrowing educational opportunities
reveals that the British were extremely defensive about their position in Egypt
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Chapter 3: Students
The Report of the Special Mission to Egypt concludes that Egyptian students were
the main cause of recent disorders and unrest in Egypt before and after the 1919
revolution. When the Mission entered Egypt, they describe that they were met with
extreme hostility from the heads of Al-Azhar University, the center of religious teaching,
and from teachers and students of government run schools. 162 The Mission explains that
“unrest among the educated classes in Egypt was, as had already been pointed out,
manifest long before the crisis of 1919.”163 It was beneficial to British officials characterize
students as the cause of the unrest because the British knew that the educated Egyptians
would be discontented with the occupation. Similar to how British officials represented the
fellahin as isolated in the provinces and the women restricted by of the constraints of the
Islamic religion, they described students as confined to their social class in the cities.
Scholars too have emphasized the important role of Egyptian student leadership of the
nationalist movement, yet British perceptions of student activism present a stark contrast.
British official documents constantly present students as inherently disobedient in order to
insinuate that their unrest was irrational and unavoidable.
Prior to the British occupation in 1882, education had been evolving for years. As
noted in chapter two, Muhammad Ali’s reforms were instrumental in creating a new
educated class of Egyptians. 164 He sent Egyptians to study abroad in Europe, established a
printing press, and opened a series of schools. One of these schools was the School of
Languages, which made it possible for European works to be translated and circulated
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throughout the nation.165 This constructed a new generation and network of intellectuals in
Egypt who used their training in European schools to share their knowledge with the larger
Egyptian populace.166 Among this new group of Egyptians was Rifa’ah Rafi al-Tahtawi,
whom historians have deemed one of the most significant reformers of Muhammad Ali’s
era.
Rifa’ah Rafi al-Tahtawi spent eight years studying at Al-Azhar before departing on
the first educational mission to France under Muhammad Ali in 1826. 167 His experience
abroad challenged his way of thinking and gave him a new Western perspective on
language, sciences, social order, and nationalism. Upon his return to Egypt, he taught in
schools, advocated for female education, and translated countless European books to make
them more accessible to Egyptians. In The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism,
Jamal Mohammad Ahmed explains that “before him European learning was practically
unknown to Egyptians and it may therefore be said that the intellectual movement in Egypt
began with his studentship in Paris and the book he wrote then.” 168 Al-Tahtawi went on to
publish seventeen books on many topics, ranging from education to social order. 169
Muhammad Ali instructed that Al-Tahtawi’s books be taught in Egyptians schools and
received notable attention because of their nationalistic tone. Ahmed describes that alTahtawi’s book Al-Manahji was the most influential book in Egypt in the nineteenth century
because he “was the first Egyptian who saw Egypt as a nation, distinct from the general
body of the Islamic community. He saw Egyptian history as something different and
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continuous.”170 He introduced a new way of thinking about Egypt that fostered the
foundation for an intellectual movement across the nation.
Muhammad Ali’s reign ended in 1848 and it was not until 1863 that educational
reforms in Egypt resumed under the rule of Khedive Ismail. During his reign from 1863 to
1879, Ismail expanded state schooling to the provinces, established a national library and
museum, and promoted educational missions abroad.171 In addition to creating specialized
schools in the cities, Khedive Ismail was dedicated to growing primary education in the
provinces. Education in the provinces was essential because of the opportunities it created
for lower class Egyptians. Furthermore, he standardized the nation’s curriculum and
testing system. Besides Muhammad Ali, scholars acknowledge Khedive Ismail’s education
reforms to be fundamental in the making of a modern Egypt. Vatikiotis claims:
the period 1863-82 was the most crucial in the evolution of modern Egypt, for the
vast educational and intellectual strides made by Egyptians after 1882 had
interesting and, in many ways, enduring social and political consequences. 172
Furthermore, Beinin argues:
western-style education concurrently expanded the ranks of the effendiyya173 and
provided a vocabulary for imagining Egypt as a political space comparable to
European nation states. Thus empowered, the effendiyya presented themselves as
bearers of a national mission and sought to forge new relations with both foreigners
and lower-class Egyptians.174
These Egyptian leaders pushed for education reforms, challenged foreign rule, and laid the
foundation for the nationalist party’s success during the occupation.
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Simultaneously, Al-Azhar University in Cairo was undergoing significant reform. As
a religious university, Al-Azhar was affected differently by educational missions. In fact, it
was more influenced by the movement of scholars throughout the Middle East rather than
Europe. Many of the intellectuals who studied at Al-Azhar were devoted to forming a
nationalistic consciousness that coincided with Islamic teachings. The notable Al-Azhar
scholar, Muhammad ‘Abduh, was committed to creating a create “a new type of ‘ulema 175
who could articulate and teach the real Islam and so provide the basis for a stable and
progressive society, a ‘middle group’ between the traditional and revolutionary forces.” 176
Students of ‘Abduh went on to become nationalist leaders in their nations when under
colonial rule. For example, in “Representing Copts and Muhammadans: Empire, Nation, and
Community in Egypt and India, 1880-1917,” C.A. Baly explains:
Indian students at the Al-Azhar seminary in Cairo, for instance, formed a network
through which the ideas of Mahomed Abduh were brought into the same public
arena as those of Syed Ahmed Khan and the Ali brothers, and other major reformers
in India.177
The networks Baly describes were imperative in constructing a nationalist ideology in
Egypt and India when confronted with colonial rule. Amongst these scholars, ideas about
imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism were discussed and shared. Thus, it can be
suggested that the intellectual class throughout the Middle East and South Asia was much
more connected than colonial officials perceived.
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The dramatic rise of Egyptian nationalism in the years preceding the war has been
attributed to the Lord Cromer’s system of rule and specifically his attitude toward
education. His priorities were to restore financial stability to Egypt and avoid the unrest
that manifested in India. Russell discloses that his experience in India taught him “that too
much education makes for an unwieldly, critical populace.” 178 She continues:
thus, he revamped the educational system in Egypt by limiting access to education,
increasing fees and the number of people paying them, changing the composition of
the student body, and changing the curriculum within the schools. 179
Lord Cromer believed this would quell antagonistic feelings towards Britain. 180Yet Robert
Tignor explains in Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 that his
policies “had the effect of doing precisely what he wanted to avoid.” 181 Lord Cromer’s harsh
method of rule led to an Egyptian political crisis by the early twentieth century. According
to Daly, “the political crisis of these years established the nationalist movement in Egypt;
consequently, the British were compelled to rely on autocratic techniques more frequently
to maintain their position.” 182 For example, Tignor explains that Lord Cromer “isolated
himself from the Egyptian population” and established “the image of superiority- both
military and moral- of the British and by punishing all efforts to challenge this position.” 183
Consequently, British officials had a difficult time understanding the Egyptian population
and were “unable to acquire accurate knowledge of the feelings of the Egyptian people.” 184
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At the same time, the educated class recognized the British officials disconnect from the
Egyptian population and used it to strengthen their nationalist campaign. They challenged
British policies and used their literacy to spread anti-British sentiments in the press.
Educated Egyptians read articles to the illiterate class to ensure that their nationalist
ideology spread to a wider range of the Egyptian population. Concurrently, in 1907 three
political parties were established: the People’s Party, the Constitutional Reform Party, and
the Nationalist Party. While these three parties were initially confined to a small sector of
society, they played a significant role in promoting nationalism among the Egyptian
population. When the British declared a protectorate at the start of World War I, the stage
was set for a mass nationalist uprising against the British.
The 1919 revolution suggests that the British were naïve to underestimate the
power of the student population or its connections to other sectors of society. Throughout
British official documents, the British persistently separate the students of Al-Azhar from
the rest of society. Official documents blame the Azharites (students of Al-Azhar) for
disturbances during the protectorate period and label them as the leaders of the entire
movement. It is not until the 1919 revolution that the British recognize the broader
students’ ability to rally the Egyptian nation through anti-British propaganda and
demonstrations. It was beneficial to separate Al-Azhar students from government students
because the British made it very clear that they were not involved with Al-Azhar. When
addressing problems in the government schools, British officials deflect the blame to
students’ parents and argue that they are inherently disobedient. Similar to how the British
presented the fellahin to be an isolated sector of society that supported the occupation,
conversely, they portrayed Egyptian students as the only sector in opposition to the
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occupation. They did this in order to validate their policies and to appear as though they
had more support than they did.
In the Special Mission to Egypt report, the Mission assesses the causes of recent and
existing disorder amongst students preceding the 1919 revolution. The British needed to
defend the work they did in government schools to justify and secure their occupation in
their colonies. In the section of the report, “The Present Situation and its Difficulties,” the
Mission states that “anti-British feeling is practically confined to the upper class and the
intelligenzia” and “it has also gained a strong hold on Azhar, and Nationalism is now
reinforced by Islamism.”185 Furthermore, they explain:
There is no general hostility to the British among the fellahin or smaller landowners.
Any manifestations of such hostility have been due to the influence of Nationalist
emissaries from the towns, exploiting religious feeling or temporary grievance
connected with the war. The most dangerous of these emissaries are the
Azharites. 186
The Mission aims to clarify in the report that the Egyptian disturbances were confined to a
small sector of society and hold the Azharites responsible for the unrest in Egypt in order
to justify their rule. British divide and rule tactics are conspicuous in this statement, as the
Mission attempts to explain Egyptian hostility by dividing society based on geographical
region and class. Furthermore, students were constantly referred to as “agitators” and
“extremists” in order to portray them to be inherently disobedient and radical. They assert
that nationalist leaders were “capable and dangerous” because of their radical religious
views.187 British officials continuously made a clear distinction between religiously
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educated Egyptians and government educated Egyptians to argue that this unrest was
confined to a small and radical sector of society.
This tactic is evident in British police commander, Russell Pasha’s autobiography.
Russell Pasha describes that “in mentioning students it is necessary to differentiate
between the students of the government schools and those of Azhar.” 188 It was necessary
and beneficial to make this distinction because the British needed to maintain that they
were not responsible for Azharites behavior. He continues:
the Azhar students were in those days a turbulent crowd, always ready to make
disturbance on any excuse that could be counted a religious one. Though usually not
mixing with the government school students, on this occasion they made common
cause with them.189
Russell Pasha’s statement insinuates that the Azharites relationship with government
students was not a normal happenstance. It also suggests that he wants to depict their
disturbances to be religiously motivated, so that the British could not be faulted. He
proceeds to discuss the accumulation of events during the 1919 revolution and describes
that “during those two days there were incidents all over the native quarters of the town,
but the focus was the Azhar Mosque, which formed a most difficult problem.” 190 It was
convenient to deem Al-Azhar as the center of the disturbances because the scope of British
authority had not extended into religious institutions.
Furthermore, when describing Egyptians who studied in Europe, British officials
degrade their education by ridiculing the thought that they could ever be equal to
Europeans. Official documents insinuate that Egyptians were inherently inferior to all
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Europeans to make the point that British control was necessary. Hooker concludes that the
nationalist movement was a product of the evolution of education over the late nineteenth
and twentieth century. He reports that “the leaders are men who style themselves as the
intellectuals of Egypt, and are mostly men of legal training, many of them educated in
Europe.”191 Hooker’s choice of language - "style themselves" - to describe nationalist
leaders undermines their intellectual ability in comparison to European intellectuals. He
continues that “the outstanding leaders are men whose ambitions have been disappointed,
men of intense vanity, and who, if given power, would be the first to misuse it.”192
Considering the pressure from the League of Nation’s newly implemented mandate system,
it was important that the British portrayed current Egyptian leaders to be incapable of
independently governing. They explain that leaders, such as Saad Zaghlul, Ismail Sidki, and
Mohamed Mahmoud, had stirred up agitation because they believed they should be valued
the same as Europeans. He concludes that these men “deliberately set to work to stir up
discontent with the existing order of things.”193 Hooker continuously notes their reckless
misuse of power by describing detailed accounts of the demonstrations the nationalist
leaders had apparently caused across Egypt to build the case that Egyptians needed British
guidance.
On account of the central role students played in the 1919 revolution, it was crucial
for the British officials to address and appear concerned about problems in the government
school system. In the report, “The Present State of Education in Egyptian Government
Schools” written by George Robb, a member of the Ministry of Education, he assesses the
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education problem in government run schools after the 1919 revolution. He refers to 1919
as the end of the “golden era” and depicts that trouble began in the schools “when all
classes of students were taught to regard themselves as the soldiers of the national
movement.”194 Robb attributes the shift in students’ attitudes to nationalist leaders such as
Saad Zaghlul, who often referred to students as his army. British officials argue that
nationalist leaders were able to captivate students’ attention when British officials
disappeared from schools and were replaced by “men of an inferior caliber” during the
protectorate period.195 Robb explains that this resulted in “the total destruction of that
spirit of obedience which the British regime fostered.” 196 Similar to how British official
reports criticize the Omdeh for abusing power in the provinces during the war, Robb
argues that nationalist leaders took advantage of students in the cities. The lack of British
presence in government schools during the war resulted in a loss of confidence in British
authority and consequently led to the 1919 student strikes. Robb recounts that teachers
“incited the students to strike, and even drove away in many cases the few students who
desired to study and avoid striking.”197 Furthermore, he continues, “it is also commonly
asserted that the Wafdist extremists have paid agents in all the schools, ready at all times to
create strikes and organize demonstrations.” 198 The British attempt to defend their work in
schools by claiming that inferior teachers forced students to strike. It was important to
proclaim that the disturbances were fostered by a select group of Egyptians, rather than a
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natural accumulation of unrest. Furthermore, Robb constantly highlighted the inadequacy
of Egyptian teachers. He portrays the Egyptian teachers as self-interested and incapable of
maintaining respect and obedience from their students to emphasize how necessary British
presence was.
The religious curriculum in government schools became troublesome to the British
when the nationalist movement gained support from Al-Azhar. British officials proclaimed
that students in every Egyptian school were being fed nationalist propaganda by their
religious teachers.199 Hooker explains that “no matter what schools the young Egyptians
attend, their religious education is given by graduates of Al-Azhar.”200 It is important to
note that many of the nationalist leaders had attended Al-Azhar, in addition to studying
abroad in Europe. Upon his arrival in Egypt, Lord Allenby states that “Al-Azhar, the great
Moslem religious college of Cairo, is the center of disaffection now; and owing to its
sanctity, it is difficult and dangerous to deal with the agitation there preached and
fostered.”201 For the British, grappling with the threat of Al-Azhar was complicated because
of the university’s religious aspect. It was convenient to harp on this factor because the
British were able to use the Muslim religion as a scapegoat. Furthermore, Mr. R. A. Brown,
a member of the Ministry of Education, describes the difficulties of religious education in
government schools in his education report. He explains “it has been extremely difficult to
know what is taught precisely on the Moslem side.” 202 Religion was the one part of the
curriculum the British were incapable of curtailing, and consequently claimed they were
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unable to determine the value of religious teaching in schools. Thus, it was easy for the
British to blame unrest in government schools on religious teachers. British officials
emphasize that “strikes were largely engineered by the teachers,” and, specifically,
religious teachers posed a threat to maintaining order amongst students. Similar to how
Robb condemns Egyptian teachers for stirring up agitation in government schools, British
officials constantly separate religious students and government students to argue that the
agitation is confined to religious educated Egyptians. 203
British official documents also note other “evils” of the educational system, which
they attribute to the growth of the movement. 204 The Mission affirms that when
government schools were run by Egyptians, order and discipline did not exist. 205 Following
the 1919 revolution, Hooker considers the main grievance amongst students to be the lack
of opportunities after graduation. Compared to the opportunities offered after graduation
in Europe, Egyptian were restricted to civil service careers. He describes that these had “no
charms for the educated youth of Egypt. Such callings entailed responsibility and hard
work, both of which are avoided, when possible, by Egyptians.”206 Hooker condemns the
educated youth by implying that they are unsatisfied with the opportunities offered in
Egypt because of their work ethic. He does this to divert attention away from the fact that
there were few opportunities for educated Egyptians. Ultimately, this led to the overcrowding of popular professions, such as law. Hooker notes that “the law school has always
been the center of all student demonstrations, and may be looked upon as the executive of
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the malcontent lawyers in Egypt.”207 Given that the majority of the Egyptian educated class
continued on to become lawyers, Hooker discredits their profession by describing them as
“malcontent lawyers.” Even within the educated class, British officials consistently
produced divisions as a strategy of domination. It was part of their strategy to divide the
educated class into teachers, religious teachers, Al-Azhar graduates, and more, in order to
explain the unrest amongst students in Egypt.
In addition to understanding how students’ unrest accumulated in schools, their
important role in the revolution forced the British to recognize the faults in the
government school system. For example, the Mission states:
while the British occupation has conferred great material benefits on Egypt and has
relieved the population from the grosser forms of oppression and injustice, it has
not in any corresponding degree raised the general level of civilization prevailing
among the vast majority or improved the conditions under which they live. This has
been mainly due to the failure of the administration to establish any system of
education which extends to the mass of the people. 208
At the time, it was important for Britain to appear concerned about the status of their
colonies because of the international scrutiny they faced after the war. Yet, rather than hold
the British Ministry of Education responsible for the lack educational reforms, the report
explains that they “cannot be held responsible for the limitations of the resources at its
disposal.”209 Once again, the British officials justified their position by blaming Egyptians
for the failures of the education system. They also note that the Ministry of Education
should not be in charge of managing schools but act as a “central guiding authority for
education.”210 Furthermore, the report gathers that the most urgent need is to extend
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national elementary education to the masses of Egyptians. This included making
elementary education free, regulating building policies, reforming the examination system,
and providing equal education in the cities and provinces. 211 They conclude that if these
reforms were adopted general civilization would improve. Yet, nonetheless, Khedive Ismail
undertook these exact education reforms during his reign before the British occupied
Egypt.212 Once again, the British conveniently ignore the fact that education reforms had
progressed prior to their occupation.
Overall, analysis of British official documents suggest that the British divided society
to appear as though they had support from some groups of Egyptians. This was apparent in
Hooker’s description of schools in the cities versus the provinces. He explains that “in
England our great schools and universities are situated far away from the excitement and
temptations of large towns.”213 While conversely, “when framing the educational system in
Egypt, those responsible failed to foresee the result of allowing boys from the Provinces to
come under the influence of a great city.” 214 Hooker’s depiction shows that British officials
wanted to portray the unrest amongst Egyptians to be confined to the cities to appear as
though they had support from Egyptians in the provinces. It was part of their governing
strategy to keep the provinces isolated from the cities. Hence, when this failed the British
criticized the Egyptian’s for not imitating the British educational system. Furthermore,
Hooker explains that “the young Egyptian, when sent to school, is deficient in many
qualities which are characteristics of the European boy. Speaking broadly, there is no moral
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training of the children in Egyptian homes, and parental discipline is generally lax.” 215 As a
result, these children are left in the care of “ignorant and fanatical servants, who instill
hatred of the foreigner in their minds.”216 Hooker’s claims suggest that the British
perceived the educated youth from the provinces to be more susceptible to nationalist
propaganda because of the environment they grew up in. It implies that the British
believed their lack of discipline at home made the Egyptians out of control and disobedient.
Additionally, he makes a clear distinction between the educated youth in Europe and Egypt
to affirm that the Europeans are naturally superior. Highlighting this distinction was
beneficial to argue an Egyptian revolution was inevitable because Egyptians were
inherently inferior to Europeans Therefore, in the perspective of the British, if Egyptians
had the same moral fiber as Europeans. Disturbances and unrest throughout Egypt would
have not taken place, and the British would not have had to step in – or to stay – to reform
the country.
Reports also emphasize the class divisions the current school system created in the
provinces. In the Ministry of Education’s report, Brown claims that one of the biggest evils
of the school system is that “a child who goes to school begins to despise his father and
mother, who could neither read nor write.”217 To solve this problem, Brown advocates for
combining primary and secondary education to increase the number of schools in the
provinces so more Egyptians could obtain a primary degree. 218 He explains that this would
allow “boys to remain at home up till the age of at least ten years, and yet not be excluded
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from the possibility of gaining a primary certificate.” 219 This is an example of the British
clearly isolating Egyptians in the provinces by narrowing education opportunities. Brown
argues that if boys spent less time in the cities, they would grow up to be more fit for a
career in agriculture. He explains that “by the old system of education, a class was being
created entirely unfitted for agriculture, the mainspring of Egypt’s prosperity.” 220 The
educated youth would “go into towns” and “tend to become effendis (high status men) and
never settle down to country life again.” 221 Brown implies that the British were concerned
with the division between educated youth and their parents because of the void it was
creating in agricultural careers, with the corollary assumption that Egyptians are more fit
for agricultural careers than they are for other ones. Furthermore, this British suggested
that the present education system strengthened class divisions and produced a supposedly
new generation of educated Egyptians in the provinces. Institutional policies that would
keep boys in the provinces at home until age ten would reinforce the Egyptian class
structure and keep them isolated from cities.
It is also clear that the British wanted to depict Egyptians as inferior by constantly
highlighting the perceived moral deficiencies of students. The prevalence of Egyptian
parents throughout education reports indicates that the British wanted to blame
government students’ unrest on their home environments. The report explains that
“Egyptian parents complain that the discipline and character of their children deteriorates
in the schools,” while “the school authorities report that the evil begins at home.” 222 It was
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convenient for British officials to illustrate disobedient acts in government schools as
distinctive Egyptian characteristics. Doing so took the responsibility off British officials
shoulders and painted Egyptian students to be naturally disobedient. Thus, in regard to
necessary reforms, the reports constantly assert that the only solution for this problem is
to “provide that the education given should train the character as well as the intelligence of
the new generation.” 223 The British were confident they could bring back the Egyptian
“spirit of obedience”224 by reforming the government school system to teach European
moral values.
Simultaneous with the events that occurred in Egypt, the British empire’s position in
colonial nations under close examination by the League of Nations. As a result, the 1919
revolution reflected poorly on their ability to govern Egypt. Considering the massive role
Egyptian students played the revolution, it is not surprising that the British attempted to
reform the government school curriculum to actually narrow educational opportunities.
Keeping the educated class isolated from conspiring with other nations was vitally
important to securing the empire. The British director of intelligence published a special
report titled “Indian and Egyptian Conspirators in England and the Remedy” that
investigates the accumulation of unrest in India and Egypt after the war. The report
explains many cases of Egyptians and Indians societies in England conspiring with native
Egyptian and Indian’s to stir up unrest in the colonies. The report states:
the purpose of this Report is to show that these two movements, if not actually
directed by natives living in England draw their inspiration from such persons, and
that the impunity with which Indians and Egyptians can hatch revolution at the
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center of the Empire re-acts very unfavorably upon the loyalty of the Egyptians and
Indians and may culminate in the commission of outrages in England itself. 225
British officials had to be aware of how the situation in the colonies correlated with
domestic disturbances. It can be insinuated that the British believed unrest in India and
Egypt did not naturally manifest but had been inspired by Indian and Egyptian
communities in England. Therefore, it was in Britain’s best interest to keep the two groups
separate by curtailing educational opportunities. British reforms kept natives illiterate, so
they could not conspire with other colonies and nations.
The Special Mission of Egypt reached the consensus that education reforms were
imperative to restoring peace and order. The repetition and weight placed on Egyptian
students in official documents published after the 1919 revolution revealed that the British
recognized the educated class to be the biggest threat to their occupation. Members of the
educated class proved to play an integral role in the revolution based on their ability to
unify the Egyptian masses. Therefore, British official documents constantly divide the
educated class based on status, occupation, geographic location to explain the unrest. They
characterize the Egyptians’ behavior to be inherent in order to defend government schools
from being held responsible for the disturbances. While the British wanted to appear
concerned with the status of education in Egypt, the lack of adequate attention paid to the
school system over the course of their occupation contradicted their claims in education
reports.
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Conclusion
The British occupation of Egypt has been a compelling topic for scholars due to the
complexity of the British empire’s position in their colonies in the post-World-War I period.
It can be concluded that international, domestic, and colonial pressure forced the British
empire to be very careful about how they positioned themselves in these contexts. When
the 1919 revolution occurred, the British had to strategically construct a narrative that
would enhance their colonial image and downplay the Egyptian nation’s unity. The extent
to which the fellahin, women, and students are repeatedly invoked in the sources suggests
that their unity in the 1919 revolution forced the British to re-double efforts to divide the
population in ways that would justify their continued presence in the country.
As this thesis argues, in the case of the 1919 revolution, the British were not
prepared for a full scale united movement because of a combination of ignorance and
calculated strategy. The British perceived the nationalist movement to be confined to
radical groups of religiously educated Egyptian men in the cities and thus were not
prepared for a mass revolutionary movement backed by all sectors of society. The British
assumed that Egyptians would not recognize the oppressive nature of their reforms and
assent to increased colonial presence during World War I. The British relied on the
imperial hierarchy and constantly professed that they were able to outsmart the Egyptians
because they were naturally inferior. Not only did the success of the 1919 revolution reveal
that the Egyptian nation was far less inept and backwards than British official documents
professed, but it also challenged the British empire’s reputation on a grand international
scale. Conclusively, the Egyptians were much more politically aware and internationally
connected than the British perceived.
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Upon completion of the Special Mission’s stay in Egypt, the Mission concluded that
abolishing the protectorate and forming a treaty was the only way to restore civil
obedience and peace in Egypt.226 At this point, the Mission recognized that British officials
underestimated the power of the nationalist movement and relied too heavily on ruling
tactics that were successful in other colonies to govern Egypt. Coming to agreement with
nationalist leaders was the only way to protect Britain’s foreign interests in Egypt and
maintain peace. The 1919 revolution marked a watershed in Egyptian history because of
the movement’s ability to bring international attention to the situation in Egypt. The
Egyptian nation’s unity and the movement’s mass scale impressed upon the British that
they needed to find new ways to maintain their interests in Egypt.
The British professed 1919 revolution to be a massive turning point for the
Egyptians. Yet, as I have shown, it was the culmination of decades of nationalist and anticolonial activism across many sectors of the Egyptian population. Moreover, the British
reaction to the revolution was to continue to divide the population in the same ways they
had before the revolution. While the revolution and the post-war international climate
persuaded the British to adopt a new form of colonialism in Egypt, “empire by treaty,” in
many ways it was still business as usual. The British continued to profess that there were
irreconcilable divisions in Egyptian society based on an essential immaturity. The
discourse following the revolution reveals continuity of British ruling tactics, not change.
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